India imposed a ban on the popular messaging app Telegram on Tuesday, just days before the scheduled NEET re-test on June 21. The restriction, set to remain in place until June 22, aims to address concerns over its alleged use by cheating networks. However, hours after the announcement, the platform remained largely operational, raising questions about the country’s technical capacity to enforce such measures effectively.
As of late afternoon on June 16, 2026, users could still access the Telegram app without interruption. The associated website and the t.me domain, used for web-based messaging, continued to function normally. An update confirmed the app’s removal from major app stores like Google Play, with a similar action expected on Apple’s platform. Yet this step has limited impact, as the service stays readily available through alternative app repositories and direct APK downloads.
Observers note that achieving a comprehensive block may prove difficult due to Telegram’s built-in features designed to resist censorship and restrictions. Cybersecurity researcher Nisarga Adhikary, known for highlighting vulnerabilities in educational systems, suggested on social media that a total shutdown might not be feasible. He pointed out the app’s architecture, which supports easy use of proxies and other circumvention techniques.
Typically, authorities direct internet service providers, such as major telecom operators, to implement bans through domain name system (DNS) blocking. This method involves ISPs intercepting requests and preventing connections to targeted services, as seen in previous actions against platforms like TikTok. When a user tries to access a blocked site, the DNS responds with misinformation about its unavailability, effectively cutting off access.
Telegram, however, operates differently. It avoids standard DNS lookups by routing encrypted requests through cloud services like Cloudflare and Google. This approach obscures the destination from ISPs, complicating traditional blocking efforts. Experts highlight that existing infrastructure may lack the sophistication to handle these methods reliably.
Beyond DNS, providers can employ advanced techniques such as deep packet inspection (DPI) to analyze traffic patterns, including volume, packet size, and signatures unique to specific applications. Server Name Indication (SNI) filtering offers another layer by examining connection details before encryption fully engages. Yet Telegram counters these with its MTProto protocol, which encrypts data and disguises traffic to mimic ordinary web activity, making selective blocking challenging.
This protocol contributed to complications during past attempts elsewhere, where efforts to isolate Telegram traffic inadvertently affected other legitimate services. Additionally, the app’s use of dynamic routing and default proxy servers further hinders consistent enforcement by major providers.
Discussions on social platforms underscore these technical hurdles. One analysis noted that Telegram’s reliance on DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) prevents interception and undermines common mitigation tactics like man-in-the-middle strategies. As a result, implementing an effective nationwide restriction demands capabilities that current systems may not fully support.
The situation highlights broader complexities in regulating resilient digital platforms while balancing security and access concerns
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